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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an amended decree of divorce • 
Appellant has filed a second appeal in this action after 
disposition in the trial court upon remand from the Court of 
Appeals. 
Appellant's first appeal resulted in an affirmance of most all 
of the disposition in the trial court and a remand for limited 
purposes. Those limited purposes were to reconsider matters 
pertaining to Finding #17 on attorney's fees and consideration with 
respect to Appellee's pension. The Appellate Court also noted the 
trial court's discretion to readjust other matters if necessary 
after reconsideration of the issues as directed. 
After remand, and appropriate proceedings, including a 
determination by the presiding judge of the trial court, that the 
trial judge was not disqualified as alleged by Appellant under the 
provisions of Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial 
court took evidence and entered Amended Findings of Fact, Amended 
Conclusions of Law and an Amended Decree of Divorce. 
Appellant claims the Amended Decree of Divorce was illegal; 
the procedures followed were improper; the remand direction was not 
followed; and that the trial court was disqualified by judicial 
bias and misconduct. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDER THE MATTERS AS 
DIRECTED BY THE REMAND ORDER AND DID THE TRIAL 
COURT MAKE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS UPON THE 
EVIDENCE? 
II. WAS THE DETERMINATION BY THE TRIAL COURT UPON 
THE FACTS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS? 
III. WAS IT PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT ASSIGNED TO 
THIS CASE TO PROCEED WITH THE FINAL 
DISPOSITION; WAS THE TRIAL COURT DISQUALIFIED 
2 
BY JUDICIAL BIAS, AND WAS THE MOTION OF 
APPELLANT CLAIMING BIAS APPROPRIATELY 
DETERMINED? 
IV. IS THE APPEAL OF APPELLANT FRIVOLOUS AND 
WITHOUT MERIT? 
V. SHOULD FEES AND COSTS BE AWARDED IN FAVOR OF 
APPELLEE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The standard of review with respect to the matters to be 
determined pertaining to the considerations of Appellee's pension, 
fees and costs involves the application of the clearly erroneous 
test, 
2. For Appellant to succeed on this appeal, she must meet 
her burden to marshal the evidence from the record to show that the 
findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the Appellee• Rule 52(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 
3. The standard of review regarding the claim of bias or 
disqualification of the court under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure involves the application of a rule or statute which will 
be reviewed by the Appellate Court for correctness. 
4. The standard for review regarding a frivolous appeal 
questions whether the appeal was meritorious from the outset or 
3 
sought for an improper purpose as described in Rule 33, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, If found to be frivolous, an appropriate 
sanction will be the award of fees and costs to Appellee, and if 
appropriate, the provisions of Rule 40, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure will be applied. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The instant case was before the trial court, the Honorable 
Judge John A. Rokich, on remand from the Court of Appeals, 
directing the trial court to consider certain limited and specified 
matters relating to insufficient findings of fact regarding 
attorney's fees and costs and Appellee's pension. The Court of 
Appeals, in commentary, noted the trial court's discretion to 
adjust other aspects of property distribution, if in determination 
of the costs, fees and pension matters, the trial court felt it 
proper to make such an adjustment. (Record 236) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because of the disposition of the Appellate Court on 
Appellant's first appeal affirming, for the most part, the trial 
court, certain matters included in Appellant's brief relating to 
the parties' marriage and the divorce proceedings are. not relevant 
and will not be discussed in Appellee's responsive brief. It is 
submitted that the factual recitation of Appellee and the Statement 
of the Case by Appellee contain the relevant matters pertaining to 
4 
this appeal. 
The remand was dated May 23, 1991. (Record 236) 
Appellant appealed March 12, 1992 from the entry of the 
amended decree of divorce. 
Appellant filed an affidavit of prejudice directed toward the 
trial court dated June 3, 1991. (Record 224) 
Appellant's affidavit was opposed by affidavit of Appellee's 
counsel. (Record 226) 
Appellee's counsel filed a notice to submit for decision under 
Rule 4-501(1)(d), Utah Rules of Judicial Administration (now Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration), the 11th day of September, 1991. 
(Record 253) 
On the 6th day of September, 1991, Appellee's counsel 
addressed a letter, with a copy to Appellant, to the trial court, 
requesting the establishment of a procedure for disposition of the 
action. (Record 258) 
Appellee's counsel filed a certification of readiness for 
trial bearing a blank date of September, but showing a filing date 
in the clerk's office of September 12, 1991. 
Appellant objected to the certification of readiness on the 
basis that discovery was not completed on medical testimony; 
stating that jury trial could be demanded, and that her motions 
needed disposition. (Record 359) 
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Appellee's counsel made a motion for scheduling and management 
conference and for an order to show cause on an unrelated matter 
pertaining to the visitation with the minor child September 23, 
1991. (Record 262) The motion was supported by a memorandum of 
points and authorities. (Record 264) 
The Court made and entered a Minute Entry 9/25/91, finding no 
bias on the part of the trial court and finding that it was 
appropriate for the judge assigned to conclude the case. (Record 
268) 
The order to show cause was personally served upon the 
Appellant on the 25th day of September, 1991, (Record 282) 
requiring her attendance in court on the 7th day of Octobetr, 1991 
at the hour of 10:00 a.m. 
The Court made a further Minute Entry dated 10/3/91 with a 
copy to Appellant, instructing her that she was required to appear 
on October 7, 1991. (Record 301) 
The Court entered a Minute Entry dated 10/7/91 showing the 
Appellant appearing on her own behalf and that the matter was set 
for evidentiary hearing on November 1, 1991 at the hour of 3:00 
p.m. (Record 302) 
The Court entered a Minute Entry dated 11/1/91, showing 
Appellant's failure to appear; that the matter of her motion to 
disqualify the Court under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure had been determined by the presiding judge, denying the 
motion and instructing the assigned judge to proceed with the 
determination of the case. 
The November 1, 1991 Minute Entry shows Appellee was sworn and 
examined and that the Court took testimony and took the matter 
under advisement. (Record 303) 
The Presiding Judge of the Third District Court entered an 
order bearing the date of December 3, 1991, confirming his 
determination that it was appropriate for the trial court judge 
assigned to conclude the matter, finding Appellant's motion legally 
insufficient. (Record 304) 
The Amended Findings of Fact, the Amended Conclusions of Law 
and the Amended Decree of Divorce were entered by the trial court 
bearing a date the 14th day of February, 1992. (Record 322 through 
335 and Record 358 through 362) 
The Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah with the Third District Court on the 12th day of 
March, 1992. (Record 375) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellant has failed to meet her burden to marshal the 
evidence in support of her attack upon the Amended Decree and to 
show that the Findings, Decree, and determination of the trial 
court were clearly erroneous. See Berger v. Berger. 713 P.2d 695 
7 
(Utah 1985), Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P. 2d 760 (Utah 1985), and 
Graff v, Graff, 699 P.2d 765 (Utah 1985). See Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Appellant's claim of judicial bias is without merit and 
was found to be legally insufficient by the Presiding Judge of the 
Third District. Appellant's claim of judicial bias lacks any 
factual basis. It was a claim raised by her for th€* first time in 
her first appeal and upon remand she reopened that door to make her 
claims under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Her claims 
were properly and appropriately determined before the evidentiary 
hearing and consideration of the issues upon remand by the assigned 
j udge. 
3. The Record shows that the trial judge appropriately and 
carefully considered the issues as directed by the remand order of 
the Court of Appeals; an evidentiary hearing occurred; significant 
evidence was taken concerning those issues; the Court made 
appropriate amendments to the findings of fact to more fully 
express the factual basis and the reasonableness and rationale 
affecting the determination of the Court. 
4. There is ample evidence in the Record to show the 
reasonableness of the Court's disposition. 
5. The appeal of Appellant is frivolous and without merit; 
costs and fees should be awarded to the Appellee. Rule 33, Utah 
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Hules oi Appellate Procedure and Rui«r . itah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, 
ARGOMENT 
1 • Fu 1 < "pJMi.l , Utah Mules oJL Civil Procedure o u t l i n e s what 
-
 v
 <=• JU * * e,d * *-! espect* *• r -ulinqs t : f a d ' " hr»t 
: - " "^- s i"--- ' -r ^ - ; i .cumertary e v i d e n c e , shdi. not 
be bet a^iOK „;;. < , - jieaiiy enuneoui. 
Rule " Findinqs by the -our i 
a) Effect. In all .actions c. ie«j ,
 Kon the tacts 
* . , * jt a jury or with an advisory jury, trie court *n.- . 
line. * * a ~T " special 1\ and state separately its 
conclusions 01 :.iv, "hereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to ,'i «- ->HA; in qr an ting r refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court, shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds ot Its ict . or: -equests for 
findings are -. ' necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of ran wN-ther based :m oral or documentary 
evidence, shal ry.: re s^ t \side unless clearly 
erroneous, ,.- ; lue rogacd sh<i , 1 be given to the 
opportunity of the tr* n court to jndge the credibility 
of the witnesses. :'•«-- findings of -a uaster. f.; the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as 
the findings of the court, it w: 11 be sufficient if the 
findings of fact and conclusions of iaw are stated orally 
and recorded in open *n urt following the close of the 
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The rriai court need not 
enter findings cf fact and conclusions of law in rulings 
on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement rf the 
ground for its decision vn al] motions granted under 
Rules 12(b) 50(a), and (b) , 5h a*d ° vh<-" the motion is 
based on ™^ >~^  than one around. 
2. The ,\ J i^ncei .i» * . : .-*.-,+ „ ^ e 
testimony and evidence tn- -.'curt . ,• •* :< - ? ^v.^.- . - che 
i ssues encompa-. < 4 Appeals remanJ. J U C r .record 
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406 through 421 and transcript, pages 13 through 27). 
3. A summary from Appellee's testimony as it pertains to the 
issues is as follows: 
a. Appellee was sworn; he testified that he purchased 
the home in 1970 1; that Appellee was married to his first wife at 
that time; that she died in April of 1980; that they were married 
for approximately twenty seven (27) years; that he thereafter 
married the Appellant, Rita Gum; that she moved into the home; that 
it was remodeled to provide sufficient space for her children from 
her previous marriages; that the funds came out of his IRA or 
otherwise were borrowed for the remodeling; that thereafter he made 
the payments from his earnings. (Record 407 through 408, 
Transcript November 1, 1991, pages 14 through 15). 
b. The Appellee's testimony showed that he took early 
retirement; that he had medical problems; that Appellant did not 
contribute anything financially to the home or to the payment of 
the encumbrance thereon; that he was married to the Appellant for 
a total of approximately six (6) years during then time he was 
employed. 
c. The testimony with respect to the West Valley home 
in which Appellant has made some claim in her appeal, shows that 
1 
This was the home that was sold pursuant to the trial court's direction prior to the conclusion of 
the divorce and produced a net equity of approximately $10,000.00. 
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A p p e l l e e ' s «*on l i v e s in t h e home; t h e home when p u r c h a s e d was 
p l a c e d in Mi1 fnin1 mniio'i nl A p p e l l a n t and A p p e l l e e f o r t h e r e a s o n 
t h a t t h e son d i d not h*iv< qoud a cdi I mnl lui in I uml l<i |ihic<- t lie 
t i t l e Lo t h e home in h i s name; the p a r t i e s d i s c u s s e d t h e bantu arid 
rpj'H * 1 "tided tlu1,1 wo 11 < i r i s i , : l i'im by t a k i n g t h e p r o p e r t y in t h e i r 
names . They then qave d yu 11 ( hum UooiJ " I In ,>• .i » on\ re^ ' i nq «iny 
i n t e r e s t In s a i d home t o him; A p p e l l a n t ab we J J a s A p p e l l e e s i g n e d 
the4 'JIM L L li>'i i iippd; i in p a n t i e s d id not p i ck out the home or 
a s s i s t in t h e down payment or any paymoni . Joi j pheep , i n s u r i i n c i ^ 
u t i l i t i e s or: t a x e s , o r t h e encumbrance a q a i n s t t h e home; n e i t h e r 
p a r t y prov u.i*.«ij .my mom-^ h i r tiic p u r c h a s e of J I ^ horn*- and A p p e l l e e 
did no t c l a i m any I n t e r e s t t h ^ r e m , |" kei . ' 
T r a n s c r i p t of November." 1, 1991 h e a r i n g , pages :«-» t n t o u q n . o : 
! mi mi in in i u»s[R jn i ! i IIIIIIP pens ion , t-he t e s t i m o n y a s 
summarized shows t h a t Appe l l ee was i n a t i . o d I. < ' ( i r s f «\.". I ' ' i 
t w e n t y seven i .' I i v ^ a r s ; t ha i lie was m a r r i e d t o A p p e l l a n t foi 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y y i q h ' " )
 (, » M • • Mi u '1"ii i <) t h e e i g h t (8) y e a r s of 
? 
The Court s Amende : • -.>. -.^  -.- -act dispose o? the TU^*.' on . oru • - »-« :;-<- '«.>• 1 "alley property as 
found at Record 331 Amended •"-•»<;: <; r * - u -•/,' , -* - . *• 
The Court having taken additional testimony of the .i^ <-r .-i..» ^ ,,.*_. j. .,-.,, the West 
Valley home, finds that the West Valley home was purchased m the name of the parties as a 
convenience to the Defendant's son because of Defendant's son's credit history; that the son 
made the down payment, occupied said home, made all of the payments, taxes and insurance and 
upkeep, and that neither of the parties to this action has an equitable interest in said home-
Plaintiff and Defendant executed and caused to be delivered a quit-claim deed for their 
interest in said home to James I. Gum prior to the instant action: on or aboi it the 23th day of 
August, 1987. 
marriage there were at least two divorce actions filed and numerous 
separations; that the Appellee had retired prior to the time of 
divorce; that after retirement there were no further accruals or 
buildups in his retirement plan; that there were only approximately 
six (6) years of accruals in his retirement plan during the period 
of the marriage due to his retirement; that he worked for his 
employer and the accruals were made to the pension plan for thirty 
six (36) years; the parties discussed the fact that Appellant 
requested $3,000.00 cash rather than claiming any interest in 
Appellee's pension or the house; that the net equity in the house 
at the time of sale was approximately $10,200.00 ;3 that the 
3 
Defendant had to make some repairs and incurred expenses to place the house in a position for sale. 
(Record 419 through 420, Transcript page 26, lines 6 through 25, page 27, lines 1 through 5, and the charges 
came to $742.07.) 
Q. (BY MR. RICHMAN) With respect the 10,200 and some odd dollars from the sale 
of the house, Rita got $3,000. 
From the funds that you got were there numerous repairs that you had to make, and 
upkeep? 
A. Yes, there were. 
Q. In order to place it in a position for sale? 
A. Yes, there were. 
Q. I'll read those off. We have a -- read the various companies and amounts. 
THE COURT: That you paid. 
THE WITNESS: I paid $520 for professional pest control for a termite inspection, and 
they found some evidence of termites and they had to treat the home. That was one on August 
13th, 1990. 
On September 4th, 1990, I paid to Reilly Construction a sum of $50 for sheetrock 
repair in one of the downstairs bedrooms that was damaged due to the termite damage. 
And then on August 9th -- August 9th, 1990, I paid $74.91 to California Repair for the 
hot tub. And then I had to have them back on August 14th, 1990, for additional repairs for 
$97.16, and those charges came to --
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A p p e l l a n t a c t u a l l y was p a i d t h e $ 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 p u r s u a n t t o tiei aqjr IMMIH MI I 
ii i! f he s t i p u l a t i o n and in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e o r i g i n a l d e c r e e , 
(Kecoru 41J ( nr uuqni i i i , i ranst M* i pt m ilm ivemlit i i 1991 h e a r i n g , 
p a g e s 18 t h r o u g h 2 1)M 
B e a r i n g on t h e i s s u e s ot t h e home e q u i t y ami the 
p e n s i o n Appn i it < l^t.t J I JIM I 11, i • f hr-i p ivpre numerous i teni'i •! 
p r o p e r t y and h o u s e h o l d I t e m s , e x p e n s i v e i tems ot l u r n i i u i H I nai 
were awarded t o A p p e l l a n t ; t h a t some o t i t i n c l u d e d h i s p r e m a r i t a l 
p r o p e r t y m iinliini N n jiinfios I hri t t i c witluc* of tho p r o p e r t y 
i t ems was a p p r o x i m a t e l y $2 f, uoii. 00 and t i u» I . I I I matKet; vd iun «i r 
<"" Jinpiited a t ripproxi mate 1 y $ I «i
 r * - 00 IMI I Record 4 14 t h r o u g h 41b , 
T r a n s c r i p t N ^ e m k i " ' lie.ji ir<i |iiqt*» M t h r r u q h ?2 ) 
4 
The Amended Findings of Fact beginning at Record 326 and cont"'.nu. .~ ,<., _,,^ „ J_'i;f •_: ...- - =*. -ward 
of property. Beginning at paragraph #11 of the Findings of Fact at Record 326, there is a Long : temization of 
property, and at Record 328, the Court values that property to have a fair narscet value o+ $14,600,00 The 
Court also addresses the property award at Finding of Fact #14, Record 328, .which indicates what the oar'ies 
had agreed to and that Plaintiff's pension would remain as his separate property 
'he Court deals with the pension and the property distribution 
• • •: .•* Record 332 and continuing through 333 at Amended Conclusion #4 
"1 he Court .aw-> .i K ..-••!•;?.• t»ac- .u- *o>. JW. 
PI a int i f f shoo. a ..«• .^w<)i >.teu ;;... .»....•. -.  = - r- e>v ' *ic w, and Do 11 ars ($3,000.00) and the 
household furniture, furnishings and household items having a fair market value of 
$14,600.00 that she has in her possession except those awarded strictly to Defendant 
which are to be returned to him, representing his interest in the proceeds from the 
sale of the parties' home and relinquishment of any claim she may have had in the 
Defendant's pension and retirement benefits which accrued strictly within the time of 
the parties' marriage, and subject to her return of the Defendant's sword, rifle, 
b i nocu I ars and I, I, ardo. 
5, All other property not previously divided shall remain the 
sole and separate property of the defendant, including his pension, savings, 
thrift and/or other benefit plans with his former employei ; his savings and 
any premarital property presently in his possession. 
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THE COURT PROPERLY ADJUSTED THE PROPERTY VALUES 
4. It is clear the Court considered the value of the 
personal property items received by Rita Gum of $14,600.00 and the 
$3,000.00 she received from the limited equity in the home was a 
reasonable adjustment of the parties property under the 
circumstances. Awarding all of the interest in the pension plan of 
Appellee to him in accordance with the parties7 stipulation at the 
time of the original divorce was considered fair and equitable by 
the trial court. 
5. It must be acknowledged that the trial court and the 
Appellee correctly concluded that the parties had entered into a 
stipulation to resolve all issues prior to the first deciree; the 
stipulation came after extensive discussions in chambers with the 
Court, Appellant and Appellee and his counsel, and that 
the findings and conclusions were made thereafter based on those 
discussions and the resulting stipulation. (Record 403, 404, 405, 
Transcript of November 1, 1991 hearing, pages 10, 11 and 12) 
SUMMARY OF NOVEMBER 1. 1991 TRIAL TRANSCRIPT 
The trial transcript is revealing on the issues of this 
appeal, including Appellant's motion for disqualification. 
Transcript page 10, lines 1 - 1 8 
THE COURT: So I didn't really make these findings 
and conclusions. It was based upon the discussions we 
had in chambers, and then it was read into the record. 
And then I gave the Plaintiff the opportunity to review 
14 
the document, * * .-i * -n* '^^ :ir .-'-Jections she could 
file them,, 
: : * r r cw where the Plaintiff is able to 
conclucK \h.-.- . J., T ,
 t---i.. :*.-*-';?; -nr •** '~' * -v> rf i ^ ii -r 
So you can put some tesi jumiy un L .. o u p ^ i : -.— 
findings You may do so, but I surely want to make sure 
that she was the one that was here, sat in court -; -
agreed, and I didn't make those orders as such untj j s.. 
time as it was submitted by what I thought wa:-
stipulation of the parties, And T think y -ur memoranda 
reflect - r;n^ * -^ ocur ate 1 \ 
So if you want to put some testimony on to support 
what was done, that's fine. You may do so 
Record 4 04, Transcript page* 1 I , lines 14 2^ Record 
Transcr i pt page 12 , 1 i ries l •• 2 I 
>v RTCHMANi I would like to also put on the record 
what h.-j. -er>- . 
We '/ent into chambers, if you recall, and spent most 
of the afternoon in there with Mrs. Gum an-* WP agreed on 
vh^*" '"•* *"houaht were most all the issues. 
irir. COUu '. IJ i 'If lit 
Mi<" J":CHMAN t.:^ -. called ' n Mr, Gum and v—•*-
through those with her CKVA we all tnought we had a i ,. 
agreement. We came out i'o.r. the court to read those into 
the record. Instead of reading : :.:»• --*-.' record, *e 
read matters we deemed needed clarifying. _t was n^ar 
the end of the day, and then we agreed to come back, ir 
kind of a hasty fashion, as M: - . ^ i,v mxious to jet 
her nan,is on $3,000 which would come out of the sale of 
the horns , r^.i that ecu] d be done as soon as the decree 
was ert°r°*~ 
± inddt' u.e decree available to her i n my office, 
pr oposed decree and findings. Whether or not she came by 
and read it, you know, that was not any of my doing. It 
was made avai 1 abl e to her and she cal 1 ed and knew it was 
available. 
She then went over that decree and findings in 
chambers, and the two of us together — and you may 
recall that she forced a change, if, by interlineation, 
so it wasn't like she didn't read it and didn't know what 
it was or what the language in the findings related to, 
because of the way we had done it, that we had agreed on 
certain things, and that was the language used 
throughout. 
THE COURT: That's why I'm at a loss how she can 
claim I was biased or prejudiced, because I did not 
compel her to sign nor did I compel her to accept what 
was set forth. 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 63(b), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
6. On the issue of the claim of Appellant that the Court 
showed bias and should have been disqualified, the Record clearly 
shows that the Court followed proper procedures as required by Rule 
63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, under which Appellant makes 
her claim of judicial bias. 
Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any 
action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney 
shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before 
whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard 
has a bias or prejudice, either against such party or his 
attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, 
such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to 
call in another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the 
reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice 
exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after 
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is 
known. If the judge against whom the affidavit is 
directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he 
shall enter an order directing that another judge (naming 
him) of the same court or of a court of like 
jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit. If the judge against whom 
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.is directed ices 
the a f f i dav 11, c i: : : 
certified f inus 
:-ther "judge must be 
the af fi'~xavi t 
sufficiency of 
affidavit is 
sufficient , -jr 
case or determ 
be e n t i t l e d ici 
i irid nc s uch a f f idav i t .^ h • • ' 
by a certificate of counsel 
not; question the legal 
:' r\e iudqe to whom the 
: : is legaliy 
called in to try the 
ne the matter in question. Mo party shall 
a m case to file more chan one affidavit; 
te filed unless accompanied 
oi record that '-uch ^fidavit 
*nH application are made good faith. 
I ,„, I Il 
pror*-*-d m g , ^ a i : m • n ^ -1 p-i'u- nes * nroucr, t ? and Ke^ord 4u4 
>vember 1, 1991 proceeding page 11, lines 1 
till O u U t 
THE COUP 
So you can pun some testimony on to support the 
landings. You may do so, but I surely want to make sure 
that she was the one that was here, sat in court and 
agreed, and T didn't make those orders as such until such 
time as it was submitted by what I thought: was a 
stipulation ty th^ parties • And I thi nk your memorandum 
reflects that accurately, 
what w»i dci<j 
to put some testimony on to support 
' s f ine You may do so, 
Mi-
has , as 
claim ot 
he sa.1 i 
THi 
, > 
1 an 
bias ,. : 
"hat \ou 
*. • /'. > 
didn't nave any 
the file 
he said, 
disguali 
for the 
"No. 1 
f 1^1 
I would like to clarify, the court 
. id, has reviewed the matter of her 
.. , ldge Murphy, the presiding judge, and 
're not to be disqualified. 
submit i e:: • wri ting to him I 
discussion being I was unable to locate 
hearing ^sked if he had the file but 
n ) 1
^ •-• ' 'sr=ue and you're not to be 
11 i "osmip 
h h KICriMAN; Ma / ~ L= ayyest 
documented. Perhaps ** . <^r. he 
Murphy did find that. 
that we have the file 
documented that Judge 
17 
THE COURT: And probably before you put on the 
testimony I think it would be better if we locate the 
file and put it in the record and you can come in some 
other time and take some testimony. 
MR. RICHMAN: Can we preserve the testimony today? 
THE COURT: Fine. That's fine. You may„ 
PRESIDING JUDGE DETERMINED THE BIAS CLAIM 
8. It is clear that the Court had presented the matter of 
judicial bias to the presiding judge; that he had been informed 
that it was proper for him to continue. Because there was not a 
document in the file indicating that determination, the Court 
determined that it would preserve testimony until the file was 
documented with the order of the presiding judge. The Court 
reserved ruling on the evidence until after the file was documented 
with an order on the bias claim. (Record 404, Transcript of 
November 1, 1991 hearing, page 11, lines 7 through 13) 
THE COURT: And probably before you put on the 
testimony I think it would be better if we locate the 
file and put it in the record and you can come in some 
other time and take some testimony. 
MR. RICHMAN: Can we preserve the testimony today? 
THE COURT: Fine. That's fine. You may. 
(Record 417, Transcript of November 1, 1991 hearing, page 24 
lines 17 through 22) 
THE COURT: It appears to me that's suffice, and I 
will withhold making a decision in the matter until such 
time as I am able to locate the file and get Judge 
Murphy's ruling. On receipt of that file and the ruling 
I will make a decision and send a minute entry to the 
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p a r t i e s . 
9 . i i ' r i "i I ' '>m • M/iiJ " ""*( I h*,j > MI i «i ii -I1 i f nppl i e s t o what 
a c t u a l Iv o c c u r r e d , t h a t tfit- Cour t p r o p e r l y put tlic. n a t t e r ul I IIM 
A p p e l l a n t ' s mot ion h a d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n uncle i Rule 6 3 ( b ) , Utah 
Cour t that the cla i m of j u d i c j a] b i a s wa s 1 e g a l J y i n s u t f i i c i en t and 
t h a t t h e t r i a ] c o u r t shoul d cone] ude t h e m a t t e r To be doub ly s u r e 
t h a t was under s tood . • t e s t::i mony was p r e s e n , fd and no r u l i n q was made 
upon t h e e v i a e r i c e unt. i 1 a f t e r a w r i t t e n document s i g n e d by t h e 
P r e s i d i nq Judqe was e n t e r e d in 1" he c a s e , 
III II in I l i t R e r u n ! makc-v- ill i I P H I I ha I H I M A p p e l l a n t knew t he 
e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g was s c h e d u l e d tor Noveinbei " 199 1 at, n 
t h e a f t e r n o o n , (Record 397 , T r a n s c r J p t ut Oc tobe r 
heai imi, p<ii|' I I line I i l hi onijh •>, Rerord DR Tr a n s c r i pt; paqe 
5
 9 ] ines 1 through 1 ] ) 
THE COURT: F"i ne • 1#l 11 schedu 1 e • i. \ or -. ~\aar; nq 
then regard inq those issues only. And tnen we can set. 
that for — it shouldn't take more than — we c*r- s«=>i- ^f 
on November ~ <^ h in the afternoon at J o'clock. 
Fit,) I,III 
THE CQUR\ ^ v e n b r r " s t , at, 3 o ' c ] ock . Okay. 
And NrIn hiv ' " ! ' " 
M S Li I 
I'HE COi * \ - ii i'iythM'3 eis- oecause *' *~r 
not noticed 
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MS. GUM: I was served an order to show cause that 
he couldn't visit his daughter. 
THE COURT: I'll take care of that on November 1st; 
set it all for November 1st and I'll hear everything at 
one time. All right. 
MS. GUM: I'll see what I can do. That's — 
11. It is clear from the record that the Court (presiding 
judge), had already determined the issue of bias before the October 
7 hearing. (Record 398, Transcript October 7 hearing, page 5, 
lines 14 through 25) 
MR. RICHMAN: — Not necessarily seeking the relief 
that she's requesting, but — or disagreeing with the 
Court, but I reviewed Rule 63 and I guess as an 
alternative you could call in another judge to determine 
the matter of her claim of bias. 
THE COURT: That's already been done. That's been 
done. I have already done that. 
MR. RICHMAN: Okay. 
MS. GUM: Thank you, sir. 
THE COURT: Judge Murphy has to make those 
determinations. 
MR. RICHMAN: And he's done that. 
THE AMENDED FINDINGS SHOW THE ISSUE OF BIAS WAS PROPERLY DETERMINED 
12. The Amended Findings of Fact deal with the claim of 
judicial bias as found at Record 331 through 332, Finding of Fact 
#22 which reads as follows: 
After remand from appeal, Plaintiff claimed bias and 
prejudice against her by the trial court. The Court 
reviewed the matter with the presiding judge who 
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conclude :i4 4 :.--*- i biat •; prejudice *?r 
disability on i->* par* of the trial oouit to hear this 
matter, and the: Jte: the Presiding Judge, Michael R. 
Murphy, entered :tn ; J JC* . ef erring the matter tc tne 
trial court for resolution, concluding that the affidavit 
of bias and prejudice filed by the Plaintiff was legale 
insufficlent. 
THE AMEND Eh _ JNCLU.SIONS SHOW THE BIAS ISSUE WAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED 
I 3, :^ \menied Concl ^ . • * .— ; • : * 
bias is f o^ •. ^ Record V*^f • "c ru* i us u*r. - /. 
'ii. . * > I'ojude? mat tne 1 r iu our* n<i 3 
improper bia- .. - prejudice aqainsr the Plaintiff JI 
either party, an. * j 4 t -o1-,. « •*.- ^ -su^ 
this action. 
APPETil iANT* b c J.A1 Jto Ajtvr, L« tx i VOxA >u 3 
\pf.*-] la? ' - :ppt . i w *M * le nas f i l e d i - r e t h a n 
i* t ;*,- - - '^ i '1e ' ' ^ f h ^ t n^*-^  jva-< n o t 
impecun; out* e c ^ r , . , * ^ > * . . 
p a g e 2 3 , i - iCJ 10 t h r o u g h -?*>) 
Mi, ij Him
 p iiiKjtliei s u b j e c t , do \ 'ou r e c a l l 1 Iimt 
when R i t a f i l e d an app€*al in t h i s c a s e she f i l e d an 
a f f i d a v i t of i m p e c u n i o s i t y ' Are you aware of t h a t ? 
'i i »«• ) i t n » 
and a t I III I i UK lie iliil t h a t had you ax&u p a i d 
h e r + ^ $ 3 , 0 0 0 ? 
- r - ne esc row d i d . 
y . niid a t t h a L 11 iiic , of \ <i> 11 • was 
she employed and earning money? 
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A. Yes, She was working at the Hilton at that 
time. 
Q. In fact the findings of fact as entered by the 
Court reflected what her earnings were, did they not? 
See Appellant's Brief dated the 16th of November, 1992, page 23, 
fourth paragraph of the Conclusion: 
11
 Rita's disposable income is far less than 
James' as well as being less stable" 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
15. On the issue of attorney's fees, the Record shows that 
the Appellant at the time of her first appeal had already received 
the $3,000.00 cash from the limited funds in the sale of the house; 
that she had failed and still refuses and fails to provide the 
Appellee the minimal items of personal property that were awarded 
to him, all of which were saleable items, including a rifle and 
scope and binoculars, and a souvenir sword; that the* Appellant was 
working; she received child support from the Appellee for two of 
her children from a previous marriage; that she had never made a 
claim for attorney's fees and that the Appellee had never been 
presented a bill for attorney's fees. (Record 416 through 417, 
Transcript of November 1, 1991 hearing, lines 15 through 25, and 
Transcript page 24, lines 1 through 13) 
16. The Court found as reflected at Record 3 26 at Amended 
Finding of Fact #8: 
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The Plaintiff is 53 years of age, having been born 
on the 20th day of January, 1937. She is employed at the 
Hilton Hotel and earns on the average of $563.60 
(computed from gross earnings of $4,422.10 through the 
pay period August 26, 1990, or thirty four (34) weeks, 
averaging $130.06 per week, 52 weeks equal annual 
earnings of $6,763.21, or $563.60 per month.) 
17. Since the original divorce the Appellant has continued to 
receive child support, and there is nothing to show she has no 
earnings from work. The Court should require inquiry under oath as 
to her impecuniosity. 
18. So long as the Appellant can abuse the Appellee by filing 
appeals or continue to prolong the legal process at great cost to 
the Appellee and at no cost to her, this matter will not be put to 
rest. See Record 278, 279 where the Appellant in argument in one 
of her numerous pleadings which bears a date of the 2nd day of 
October, 1991, at paragraph 4, Record 278, states: 
Plaintiff should be able to continue to prolong the 
legal process regardless of the expense of the litigation 
if that is what is necessary to get that which is 
rightfully hers and the children's. 
19. The Amended Findings of Fact the Court entered pertaining 
to attorney's fees are found at Record 329 and 330, Findings of 
Fact as Amended, #17, which read as follows: 
The Court amends Findings #17 of the original 
Findings of Fact to read as follows: 
Plaintiff appeared before the Court on the 6th day 
of December, 1990, pro se. Prior thereto she had filed 
with the Court a document she labeled "Supplement to 
Complaint and Partial Response to Defendant's Counter 
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Offer of July 25, 1990", outlining therein her desire for 
a settlement and outlining terms thereof. The Court 
participated in discussions with the Plaintiff and 
Defendant's counsel and it appeared to the Court that the 
proposals being put forward by the Plaintiff were 
acceptable to Defendant as represented by counsel. The 
Defendant was then called in to the presence of the Court 
and the parties reached an agreement to settle all of 
their matters before the Court. Thereafter the Defendant 
was sworn and gave testimony in support of his cause and 
to establish jurisdiction and residence as before 
recited. Plaintiff made no request on the record for 
attorney's fees or costs, and offered no evidence to the 
Court for fees and costs, [emphasis supplied] 
20. The Conclusions of Law that the Court made from the 
evidence pertaining to attorney's fees is found at Record 3 34, 
Conclusion of Law #9, which the Court amended: 
The Court amended Conclusion #9 to read" 
Each party should be responsible for and pay their 
separate costs and fees as agreed to by the parties 
before the Court and for the reason that neither party 
thereafter made any request for fees or costs or placed 
any testimony or evidence before the Court regarding fees 
and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court acted appropriately; the matter of judicial 
bias was determined by the Presiding Judge prior to the October 1, 
1991 hearing; the written document reflecting the Presiding Judge's 
determination was entered the 3rd day of December, 1991. Appellant 
was informed at the management and scheduling conference on October 
7, 1991, that an evidentiary hearing would take place on the 1st 
day of November, 1991. She did not make it known to the Court or 
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the Appellee or his counsel that she would not appear, but she 
chose of her own volition not to appear at the evidentiary hearing. 
The testimony of Appellee was preserved pending receipt of the 
written document of the ruling of the presiding judge• No ruling 
was made until after the written document was received by the trial 
court and filed. 
The trial court has appropriately addressed the issues as 
directed by the remand order and has entered appropriate Amended 
Findings, Amended Conclusions and an Amended Decree. The total 
judgment of the Court is supported by the evidence. The specific 
matters which the trial court was directed to consider have been 
addressed and evidence was received thereon. The Court's rationale 
is spelled out specifically and appropriately and is fair and 
reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
The procedure followed was a correct procedure. 
The Appellant failed to marshal the evidence in support of any 
of the issues which she has raised. 
The Appellant's appeal is without merit and has been sought 
for an improper purpose to prolong the legal process. 
Her affidavit of impecuniosity should be questioned and an 
award of attorney's fees and costs should be made to the Appellee 
upon the filing of an appropriate affidavit or upon a hearing 
specifically for that purpose and no other. 
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DATED this cU n day of January, 1993, 
GLEN M. RICHMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
—7&AP1 -W/ K;/£^U*^_ / 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct copies of 
the Brief of Appellee to be hand-delivered to Plaintiff - Appellant 
by delivering a copy to her at her address: 
Rita C. Gum 
1034 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
the address shown on Appellant's Brief on this rU ?5 — d a y of 
January, 1993. I further certify that I caused to be mailed four 
copies of the same, sealed with first class postage prepaid thereon 
in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the day 
of January, 1993. 
LEORA LOY 
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appendix 
the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all 
questions of fact 
(Amended effective Jan 1, 1987 ) 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts with-
out a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be en-
tered pursuant to Rule 58A, in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action Requests for find-
ings are not necessary for purposes of review Find-
ings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the find-
ings of the court It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and re-
corded m open court following the close of the evi-
dence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of de-
cision filed by the court The trial court need not en-
ter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings 
on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb) The 
court shall however issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground 
(b) Amendment. UDon motion of a party made not 
later than 10 davs after entry of judgment the court 
may amend its findings or make additional findings 
and may amend the judgment accordingly The mo-
tion may be made with a motion for a new trial pur-
suant to Rule 59 When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried b\ the court without a jury, the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the find-
ings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district 
court an objection to such findings or has made either 
a motion to amend them a motion for judgment, or a 
motion for a new trial 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties 
to an issue of fact 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the 
trial, 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause, 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in 
the minutes 
(Amended effective Jan 1, 1987 ) 
Rule 53. Masters. 
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all 
of the issues in an action may be referred by the court 
to a master upon the written consent of the parties, or 
the court may appoint a master in an action, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Subdivision (b) of this 
rule As used in these rules the word "master" in-
cludes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner The 
compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed 
by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the 
parties or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the 
action, which is in the custody and control of the 
court as the court may direct The master shall not 
retain his report as security for his compensation, but 
when the party ordered to pay the compensation al-
entitled k. a writ of execution against the delinquent 
party 
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the 
exception and not the rule In actions to be tried by a 
jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues 
are complicated, in actions to be tried without a jury, 
save in matters of account, a reference shall, in the 
absence of the written consent of the parties, be made 
only upon a showing that some exceptional condition 
requires it 
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master 
may specify or limit his powers and may direct him to 
report only upon particular issues or to do or perform 
particular acts or to receive and report evidence onl> 
and may fix the time and place for beginning and 
closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's 
report Subject to the specifications and limitations 
stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise 
the power to regulate all proceedings in every hear-
ing before him and to do all acts and take all mea-
sures necessary or proper for the efficient perfor-
mance of his duties under the order He may require 
the production before him of evidence upon all mat-
ters embraced in the reference, including the produc-
tion of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and 
writings applicable thereto He may rule upon the 
admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by 
the order of reference and has the authority to put 
witnesses on oath and may himself examine them 
and may call the parties to the action and examine 
them upon oath When a party so requests, the mas-
ter shall make a record of the evidence offered and 
excluded in the same manner and subject to the same 
limitations as piovided in the Utah Rules of Evidence 
for a court sitting without a jury 
(d) Proceedings. 
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the 
clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a 
copy of the order of reference Upon receipt 
thereof unless the order of reference otherwise 
provides the master shall forthwith set a time 
and place for the first meeting of the parties or 
their attorneys to be held within 20 days after 
the date of the order of reference and shall notify 
the parties or their attorneys It is the duty of the 
master to proceed with all reasonable diligence 
Either party, on notice to the parties and master, 
may apply to the court for an order requiring the 
master to speed the proceedings and to make his 
report If a party fails to appear at the time and 
place appointed, the master may proceed ex parte 
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a 
future da\, giving notice to the absent party of 
the adjournment 
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the 
attendance of witnesses before the master bv the 
issuance and service of subpoenas as provided in 
Rule 45 If without adequate excuse a witness 
fails to appear or give evidence, he may be pun-
ished as for a contempt and be subjected to the 
consequences, penalties, and remedies provided 
in Rules 37 and 45 
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of 
accounting are in issue before the master he 
may prescribe the form in which the accounts 
shall be submitted and in any proper case may 
require or receive in evidence a statement by a 
certified public accountant who is called as a wit-
ness Upon objection of a party to any of the 
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the 
appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay 
proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to 
suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction, writ 
of mandate or writ of prohibition during the pendency 
of an appeal or to make any order appropriate to pre-
serve the status quo or the effectiveness of the judg-
ment subsequently to be entered 
ih) Stay of judgment upon multiple claims. 
When a court has ordered a final judgment on some 
but not all of the claims presented in the action under 
the conditions stated in Rule 54(b), the court may 
stay enforcement of that judgment until the entering 
of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may pre-
scribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the 
benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judg-
ment is entered 
u) Excepting to sureties; justification; multiple 
sureties; deposit in lieu of bond. The adverse party 
mav except to the sufficiency of the sureties to the 
undertaking filed pursuant to the provisions of this 
rule at any time within 10 days after written notice of 
the filing of such undertakings, and, unless they or 
other sureties, within 10 days after service of the no-
tice of such exception, justify before a judge of the 
court in which the judgment was entered, or the clerk 
thereof, upon not less than five days' notice to the 
party excepting to such sureties of the time and place 
of justification, execution of the judgment is no longer 
stayed In all cases where the bond required exceeds 
$2,000 and there are more than two sureties thereon, 
they may state in their affidavits that they are 
severally worth the amounts for which they agree to 
be found if less than that expressed in the undertak-
ing, provided the whole amount is equivalent to that 
of two sufficient sureties In all cases where an under-
taking is required by these rules a deposit in court in 
the amount of such undertaking, or such lesser 
amount as the court may order, is equivalent to the 
filing of the undertaking 
(j) Waiver of undertaking. In all cases the parties 
may by written stipulation waive the requirements of 
this rule with respect to the filing of a bond or under-
taking 
Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a 
judge. 
(a) Disability. If by reason of death, sickness, or 
other disability, a judge before whom an action has 
been tried is unable to perform the duties to be per-
formed by the court under these rules after a verdict 
is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are filed, then any other judge regularly sitting in or 
assigned to the court in which the action was tried 
may perform those duties; but if such other judge is 
satisfied that he cannot perform those duties because 
he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, 
he may m his discretion grant a new trial 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any ac-
tion or proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney 
shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before 
whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard 
has a bias or prejudice, either against such party or 
his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the 
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, ex-
cePt to call in another judge to hear and determine 
the matter 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the 
Masons for the belief that such bias or prejudice 
exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after 
toe case has been assigned or such bias or preiudice is 
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be 
forthwith certified to another judge (naming him) of 
the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, v/hich 
judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the 
affidavit, if the judge against whom the affidavit is 
directed does not question the legal sufficiency of the 
affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certi-
fied finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge 
must be called in to try the case or determine the 
matter in question. No party shall be entitled in any 
case to file more than one affidavit, and no such affi-
davit shall be filed unless accompanied b> a certifi-
cate of counsel of record that such affidavit and appli-
cation are made in good faith 
Rule 63A. Change of judge as a matter of right. 
(a) Notice of change. Except in small claims pro-
ceedings, in any civil action commenced after April 
15, 1992 in any district or circuit court, all parties 
joined in the action ma\ by unanimous agreement 
and without cause, change the judge assigned to the 
action by filing a notice of change of judge The par-
ties shall send a copy of the notice to the assigned 
judge and the presiding judge The notice shall be 
signed by all parties and shall state (1) the name of 
the assigned judge, (2) the date on which the action 
was commenced, (3) that all parties joined in the ac-
tion have agreed to the change, (4) that no Dther per-
sons are expected to be named as parties, and (5) that 
a good faith effort has been mads to serve all parties 
named in the pleadings The notice shall not specify 
any reason for the change of judge Under no circum-
stances shall more than one change of judge be al-
lowed under this rule in an action 
(b) Time. Unless extended by the court upon a 
showing of good cause, the notice must be filed within 
90 days after commencement of the action or prior to 
the notice of trial setting, whichever occurs first 
Failure to file a timely notice precludes any change of 
judge under this rule 
(c) Assignment of action. Upon the filing of a no-
tice of change, the assigned judge shall take no fur-
ther action in the case The presiding judge shall 
promptly determine whether the notice is pioper and, 
if so, shall reassign the action Ii the presiding judge 
is also the assigned judge, the clerk shall promptly 
send the notice to the Chief Justice, who shall deter-
mine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall 
reassign the action 
(d) Nondisclosure to court. No party shall com-
municate to the court, or cause another to communi-
cate to the court, the fact of any party's seeking con-
sent to a notice of change 
(e) Rule 63 unaffected. This rule does not affect 
any rights under Rule 63. 
(Added effective April 15, 1992 ) 
PART VIII. 
PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES AND 
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
Rule 64A. Prejudgment writs of replevin, at-
tachment and garnishment. 
Prejudgment writs of replevin, attachment and 
garnishment may be issued under the following con-
ditions and circumstances 
(1) The writ shall issue only upon written mo-
tion and pursuant to a written order of Ihe court 
(2) The court shall not direct the isouance of 
[ be given an expedited setting for oral argument 
hin 45 to 60 days from the date of the order grant-
the motion. Within two days after submission of 
appeal, the court will conference, decide the case, 
t issue a written order which need not be accompa-
d by an opinion. Entry of the order by the clerk in 
records of the court, shall constitute the entry of 
judgment of the court. 
e) Precedential effect. Appeals decided under 
s rule will not stand as precedent, but, in other 
pects, will have the same force and effect as other 
:isions of the court. 
f) Issuance of written opinion. If it appears to 
» court after the case has been submitted for deci-
n that a written opinion should be issued, the time 
litation in paragraph (d) shall not apply and the 
rties will be so notified. 
lie 32. Interest on judgment. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for 
>ney in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is 
.owed by law shall be payable from the date the 
igment was entered in the trial court. 
ule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; 
recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Ex-
pt in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the 
urt determines that a motion made or appeal taken 
ider these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
tall award just damages, which may include single 
• double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reason-
Die attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court 
iay order that the damages be paid by the party or 
f the party's attorney 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a 
ivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one 
lat is not grounded in fact, not warranted by exist-
lg law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
xtend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
lotion, brief, or other paper interposed for the pur-
ose of delay is one interposed for any improper pur-
ose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the 
ost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only 
he party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other 
taper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon re-
quest of any party or upon its own motion. A 
party may request damages under this rule only 
as part of the appellee's motion for summary dis-
position under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's 
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion 
or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion 
of the court, the court shall issue to the party or 
the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. 
The order to show cause shall set forth the alle-
gations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond un-
less otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The 
order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom dam-
ages may be awarded, the court shall grant a 
hearing. 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise pro-
or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against ap-
pellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or 
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the ap-
pellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or or-
der is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs 
shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall 
not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In 
cases involving the state of Utah or an agency or 
officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the 
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless 
specifically required or prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, 
bonds and other expenses on appeal. The follow-
ing may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing 
party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or 
typewritten brief or memoranda and attachments not 
to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in 
the preparation and transmission of the record, in-
cluding costs of the reporter's transcript unless other-
wise ordered by the court; premiums paid for superse-
deas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; 
and the fees for filing and docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. When 
costs are awarded to a party in an appeal, a party 
claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remitti-
tur is filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve upon 
the adverse party and file with the clerk of the trial 
court an itemized and verified bill of costs. The ad-
verse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of 
costs, serve and file a notice of objection, together 
with a motion to have the costs taxed by the trial 
court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within 
the allotted time, the clerk of the trial court shall tax 
the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party 
entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in 
the judgment docket with the same force and effect as 
in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost 
bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the 
clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax 
the costs and enter a final determination and judg-
ment which shall thereupon be entered in the judg-
ment docket with the same force and effect as in the 
case of other judgments of record. The determination 
of the clerk shall be reviewable by the trial court 
upon the request of either party made within 5 days 
of the entry of the judgment. 
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency ap-
peals. In all other matters before the court, including 
appeals from an agency, costs may be allowed as in 
cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days 
after the expiration of the time in which a petition for 
rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an 
order denying such a petition, the party to whom 
costs have been awarded may file with the clerk of 
the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party 
an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse 
party may, within 5 days after the service of the bill 
of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to have 
the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost 
bill is filed within the allotted time, the clerk shall 
thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment against 
the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects 
to the cost bill, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and 
hearing, shall determine and settle the costs, tax the 
same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon 
against the adverse party. The determination by the 
clerk shall be reviewable by the court upon the re-
quest of either party made within 5 days of the entry 
nf indfirment: unless otherwise ordered, oral argument 
death, substitution shall be effected in accordance 
with the procedure prescribed m paragraph (a) of this 
rule 
<c) Public officers; death or separation from 
office. 
(1) When a public officer is a party to an ap-
peal or other proceeding in an official capacity 
and during its pendency dies, resigns or other-
wise ceases to hold office, the action does not 
abate and the public officer's successor is auto-
matically substituted as a party Proceedings fol-
lowing the substitution shall be in the name of 
the substituted party, but any misnomer not af-
fecting the substantial rights of the parties shall 
be disregarded An order of substitution may be 
entered at any time, but the omission to enter 
such an order shall not affect the substitution 
(2) When a public officer is a party to an ap-
peal or other proceeding in an official capacity, 
the public officer may be described as a party by 
official title rather than by name, but the court 
may require the name to be added 
Rule 39. Duties of the clerk. 
(a) General provisions. The office of the Clerk of 
the Court, with the clerk or a deputy in attendance, 
shall be open during business hours on all days ex-
cept Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays 
(b) The docket; calendar; other records re-
quired. The clerk shall keep a record, known as the 
docket, in form and style as may be prescribed by the 
court, and shall enter therein each case The number 
of each case shall be noted on the page of the docket 
whereon the first entrv is made All papers filed with 
the clerk and all process, orders and opinions shall be 
entered chronologically in the docket on the pages 
assigned to the case Entries shall be brief but shall 
show the nature of each paper filed or decision or 
order entered and the date thereof The clerk shall 
keep a suitable index of cases contained in the docket 
The clerk may keep a minute book, in which shall 
be entered a record of the daily proceedings of the 
court The clerk shall prepare, under the direction of 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the Presid-
ing Judge of the Court of Appeals, a calendar of cases 
awaiting argument In placing cases on the calendar 
for argument, the clerk shall give preference to ap-
peals in accordance with the priority of cases pro-
vided in Rule 29 
(c) Notice of orders. Immediately upon the entry 
of an order or decision, the clerk shall serve a notice 
of entry by mail upon each party to the proceeding, 
together with a copy of any opinion respecting the 
order or decision Service on a party represented by 
counsel shall be made upon counsel 
(d) Custody of records and papers. The clerk 
shall have custody of the records and papers of the 
court The clerk shall not permit any original record 
or paper to be removed from the court, except as au-
thorized by these rules or the orders or instructions of 
the court Original papers transmitted as the record 
on appeal or review shall upon disposition of the case 
be returned to the court or agency from which they 
were received The clerk shall preserve copies of 
briefs and attachments, as well as other printed pa-
pers filed 
Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanc-
tions and discipline. 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every mo-
record who is an active merrber in good standing of 
the Bar of this state The attorney shall sign his or 
her individual name and give his or her business ad-
dress, telephone number, and Utah State Bar num-
ber A party who is not represented bv an attorney 
shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper and state 
the party's address and telephone number Except 
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or stat-
ute, motions, briefs, or other papers need not be veri-
fied or accompanied by affidavit The signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the 
attornev or party has read the motion, brief, or other 
paper, that to the best of his or her knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it 
is not frivolous or interposed for the purpose of delay 
as defined in Rule 33 If a motion, brief, or other pa-
per is not signed as required by this ru e, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptlv after the omis-
sion is called to the attention of the attorney or party 
If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation 
of this rule, the authority and the procedures of the 
court provided by Rule 33 shall apply 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of atlorneys and 
parties. The court may, after reasonable notice and 
an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and 
upon hearing, if requested, ake appropriate action 
against any attorney or person who prad ices before it 
for inadequate representation of a client, conduct un-
becoming a member of the Bar or a person allowed to 
appear before the court, or for failure to comply with 
these rules or order of the court Any action to sus-
pend or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall 
be referred to trie Ethics and Discipline Committee of 
the State Bar for proceedings in accordance with the 
Rules of Discipline of the Shate Bar 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This 
rule shall not be construed to limit or impair the 
court's inherent and statutory contempt powers 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An at-
torney who is licensed to practice before the bar of 
another state or a foreign country but who is not a 
member of the Bar ot this s-ate, may appear, upon 
motion, pro hac vice Such attorney shall associate 
with an active member in good standing of the Bar of 
this state and shall be subject to the pro\isions of this 
rule and all other rules of appellate procedure 
TITLE VI. CERTIFICATION AND 
TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS. 
Rule 41. Certification of questions of law by 
United States courts. 
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. 
The Utah Supreme Court may in its discretion an-
swer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court 
of the United States when requested to do so by such 
certifying court acting in accordance with the provi-
sions of this rule, but only if the state of the law of 
Utah applicable to a proceeding before the certifying 
court is uncertain and answering the certified ques-
tion will not unduly interfere with the Utah Supreme 
Court's regular functioning or be inconsistent with 
the timely and orderly development of t i e decisional 
law of the state 
(b) Procedure to invoke. Any court referred to in 
paragraph (a) may invoke this rule by entering an 
order of certification as described in thi 3 rule When 
invoking this rule the certify ng court may act either 
sua sponte or upon a motion by any party 
(c) Certification order. 
